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The common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts thus close the front
entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to
idle or prurient curiosity?'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The battle between the public's right to information2 and the
individual's right to privacy 3 is as old as the First Amendment itself.
Judges for centuries have struggled to balance the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted intrusion into his private life4 against
the media's need to "serve the public interest in news."' The task has
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
218 (1890).
2. Whether the public has a constitutional "right to know" under the First Amendment
is a matter of some debate. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975).
3. For an excellent discussion of the origins of the common law right to privacy, see
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 195.
5. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 (1967) (quoting Harry J. Kalven, Jr., Privacy in
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not always been easy. Champions of free speech have accused privacy-oriented judges of eroding the spirit, as well as the letter, of the
First Amendment.6 Conversely, those who favor a broader notion of
privacy maintain that "the right to privacy is necessary for the autonomy of individuals, even at the cost of some flawed decisions on the
part of ignorant others."' The paradoxical and often inconsistent attitudes many Americans hold regarding the government's role in regulating the free expression of its citizens exacerbates this situation.'
While most Americans agree that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited [and] robust,"9 the majority also believes that the individual must have some space that is off limits to others if our society is to
be "a fit [place] in which people will gladly live." 10
Nowhere has this attempt to "harmonize individual rights and
community interests"'" been more heated than in the homosexual
community. Largely because of Biblical injunctions surrounding sodTort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 335-36
(1966).
6. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Should Rape Victims Be Named?, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 21, 1991, at Cl.
7. KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 182 (1988); see also Susan Estrich, Should Rape
Victims Be Named?, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 1991, at Cl.
8. In a survey of 1,500 Americans conducted by the Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression, 90% of those surveyed said they felt the government has no
right to tell people what to do or say, while only 65% of that same group felt that the press
should be allowed to print whatever it chooses. Shrona Foreman, Survey Finds Confusion
About Free Expression, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16, 1990, at 12A. Responses to a recent Miami
Heraldsurvey on the subject of whether to print the names of clients of an alleged prostitute
revealed similar tension. One reader wrote: "If you publish the names of these men ... you
also expose their mothers, fathers, and children and, yes, indeed, their entire families."
Another reader said: "One doesn't have to be college educated to realize that too many of our
business and political leaders and citizens are hypocrites.... [I]t is the duty of the news media
... to expose all who deceive us, for if you don't, who will?" Doug Clifton, I Asked For Your
Thoughts. You Gave Them, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 8, 1991, at 4C. Not all countries, however,
agree with the assumption that the private lives of public figures are fair game for media
coverage. In France, the private lives of public figures are considered personal affairs. See
Sharon Waxman, Interview Linking Actor to Rape Angers French, MIAMI HERALD, April 2,
1991, at 3A.
9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963).
10. SCHEPPELE, supra note 7, at 182. A recent survey of editors and news directors
reported a 45% increase in reader concern with the media's effect on personal privacy in the
last five years. SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: How
THEY Co-EXIST 1 (1990). Surprisingly, the media appears sympathetic to the public's
position. Journalists today are more likely to place an individual's right to privacy above the
public's right to know, especially when it comes to reporting crimes. Id. at 3. Some
newspapers, in fact, have even begun surveying their readers to determine whether information
about the private lives of individuals is "newsworthy." See Doug Clifton, Should We Print
Names of Accused Prostitute'sClients?, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 1, 1991, at 4C.
11. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 (1967).
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and society's general reticence toward matters concerning sexuality,'" most homosexuals have chosen to keep their sexual
orientation private.' 4 Those gay people who have made their sexual
orientation known have paid a price, often sacrificing their careers,' 5
their families, 16 and even their lives 17 in the process.
In the face of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")
and changing attitudes toward homosexuality, however, the so-called
"conspiracy of silence" appears to be ending. A number of prominent
public figures recently have come forward and announced their homosexuality in the media,' and several gay rights groups, in unrelated
omy,'

12. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF

SEXUALITY

38 (1980). The specific passage,

cited in Leviticus 18:22, reads: "Thou Shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; it is
abomination."
13. FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 3. In a somewhat alarming report released recently by
the Kinsey Institute, 55% of Americans surveyed were unable to answer questions which

tested basic sexual knowledge. Roughly one-quarter knew that the typical American first has
intercourse at age 16 to 17; about the same number correctly estimated that 30-40% of
married men have had an extramarital affair. Respondents unanimously reported
dissatisfaction with their ability to communicate honestly and openly about sexual matters to
their mates. Don Oldenburg, Sexually Confused? Well, So Are Some Experts .. , WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 1990, at B5.

14. In an interview with the Senate Judiciary Committee in August, 1986, Jeffrey W. Levi,
Executive Director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, estimated that his
organization had about 10,000 members. Yet in research conducted by Alfred Kinsey and his
colleagues at the Institute for Sex research between 1938 and 1963, the Institute found that
roughly one in three men and one in five women have had at least some overtly homosexual
experience between their teen years and middle age. Twenty-one percent of white, collegeeducated men and seven percent of white, college-educated women reported having had sex
with two or more persons of their own gender, or having had gay sex six or more times.
MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: How AMERICA WILL CONQUER
ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE '90S 13-14 (1989).
15. For a general discussion of the problems gays experience being "out" on the job, see
DON CLARK, THE NEW LOVING SOMEONE GAY 132-41 (1987).
For more specific
discussions of problems related to particular professions, see ROCK HUDSON & SARA
DAVIDSON, ROCK HUDSON: His STORY (1986) (actors and entertainers); DAVID KOPAY &
PERRY D. YOUNG, THE DAVID KOPAY STORY (1977) (professional athletes); Lynn Miller,
The Legal Closet, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1988, at 13 (gay lawyers and law students); Thomas
A. Stewart, Gay in CorporateAmerica, FORTUNE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 43 (business executives).
16. See CLARK, supra note 15, at 134.
17. See generally RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF HARVEY MILK (1982) (chronicling the assassination of San Francisco City
Supervisor Harvey Milk).
18. Among those in public positions who have come out in the last five years are former
professional baseball umpire Dave Pallone, David Colker, Secret Behind the Mask; A Former
Umpire Discusses One of His Life's Tough Calls: Being Gay and in Pro Baseball, L.A. TIMES,
June 22, 1990, at El; Hollywood mogul David Geffen, Jennet Conant, Doesn't David Geffen
Know the Eighties Are Over?, GENTLEMEN'S Q., Mar. 1991, at 239; two United States
congressmen, Mitchell Zuckoff, Frank Tells Gay Alliance That 'Outing' is Wrong, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 16, 1990, at 29; television star Dick Sargent, TV Star's Revelation Shocks
Hollywood, MIAMI HERALD, at Cl; and world-class bodybuilder Bob Paris, Lonnie Teper, Bob
Paris: Be True to Yourself, IRONMAN, July 1989, at 87.
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actions, have attempted to expose, or "out," politicians and public
figures who lead double lives.19 Even among members of the heterosexual community, the notion that what a person does in bed is his
own business 2 -once the unwritten, rule among homosexuals-is no
longer considered self-evident.
This Comment examines the ethical and legal issues raised by the
movement to "out" closeted gay people. Specifically, the Comment
focuses on the question of what interest, if any, the public has in a
person's sexual orientation, and under what circumstances, if any,
that interest outweighs the individual's right "to be let alone." 2 1 Part
II examines the changes in social and political attitudes toward homosexuality that have taken place in the United States22 within the last
twenty years, and how those changes have influenced the legal and
ethical debate concerning the outing of closeted homosexuals. Part
III discusses the arguments made by those on both sides of the outing
debate, paying special attention to the ethical considerations raised by
both groups. Part IV raises the question whether there is such a thing
as a "private fact," and if so, whether sexual orientation is one. Part
IV also attempts to draw distinctions between the outing of public
and private figures to see under what circumstances, if any, courts
ought to recognize a common law right to privacy with regard to sexual orientation. The Comment concludes by asking whether moral
principles exist that make outing an ethically indefensible political
strategy.
19. Most of the politicians outed by groups such as the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power
("ACT-UP") have taken political positions inimical to gay rights and AIDS legislation. Kim
I. Mills, Gays Crying Gay, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 1990, at 24 (discussing outing of
Republican Senator Mark Hatfield). However, many prominent celebrities and public figures
have been outed by gay magazines and tabloids as well. These Stars Are Gay, GLOBE, Nov. 20,
1990, at 6; see also Felicity Barringer, On 25th Year, NOW ReassertsIts Role as Outsider,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at 11 (discussing National Organization for Women ("NOW") President
Patricia Ireland's relationship with her female "companion"); Guy Trebay, Show and Tell,
VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 12, 1991, at 16 (discussing outing of actress Jodie Foster);.
20. Readers React to Column on Gay Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 1, 1990, at BI
(quoting unsigned author of letter to columnist Charles Whited).
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
22. Although "outing" is not a uniquely American phenomena, for purposes of this
Comment, discussion of attitudes toward homosexuality and outing will be confined to the
United States. For discussions of outings in other countries, see Nick Cohen, "Outing" Group
to Name MPs as Homosexual, INDEPENDENT, July 29, 1991, at 1 (England); Bones of

Contention, DAILY

TELEGRAPH,

Aug. 19, 1991, at 14 (Germany).
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LEGAL DILEMMA OF "OUTING"
OUTING, SEXUALITY, AND PRIVACY:
OVERVIEW

A.

A SOCIOLOGICAL

The Origins of Outing

In its most widely used sense, outing refers to the revealing of the
homosexuality of closeted celebrities and public officials.23 The term
is derived from the phrase "coming out of the closet," which has
come to signify the act of publicly acknowledging one's homosexuality.2 4 In actuality, however, the term has been expanded to include
limited public figures and private actors.2 5
Recent outings differ from those in earlier years in two significant
respects. First, unlike prior public disclosures of a person's sexual
orientation, recent outings originate in the gay community. 26 Additionally, whereas early disclosures were motivated almost exclusively
by a desire to embarrass, degrade, or humiliate homosexuals, 27 outings within the gay community are normally designed to promote pos28
itive images of gay people.
Members of the gay community offer a number of reasons to justify outing fellow gays. While some gay rights groups cite exposing
23. Pat H. Broeske & John M. Wilson, Outing Target Hollywood, L.A. TIMES, July 22,
1990, at 6. Although people have been forced out of the closet for centuries, only within the
last four years has outing become recognized as a social movement by the media. When used
in this Comment, the term "outing" refers to any situation in which one person discloses the
sexual orientation of another against his will to a third party or parties.
24. Jack Rosenthal, On Language, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 16. The
first "official" outing occurred in March 1989, when Michelangelo Signorile, a columnist for
Out Week, a gay news magazine, authored a posthumous column entitled "The Secret Gay Life
of Malcolm Forbes." Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 6. In the article, Signorile revealed
that Forbes had led a clandestine homosexual life for many years. Id.
25. See Cliff O'Neill, Lesbian Reporter Fired After Campaign by Radio Preacher Seeks
Damages in Discrimination, Invasion of Privacy Suit, WEEKLY NEWS, Dec. 12, 1990, at 13
(citing reporter's anger at radio broadcaster for "outing" her); see also In re Kowalski, 1991
WL 263225 (Minn. Ct. App.) (disputing trial court's suggestion that lesbian's statement to the
media and her lover's family that the two were lesbians could give rise to the level of an
actionable tort); Victoria Slind-Flor, Gays out of the Closet: Whose Decision Is It?, MIAMI
REV., May 9, 1990, at 13 (discussing former U.S. Rep. Jon Hinson's being outed after he was
arrested in 1981 for having sex in men's bathroom of Longworth House Office Building in
1978).
26. Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 6. Among the groups that have actively endorsed
outing are ACT-UP and Queer Nation, a coalition of radical gays and lesbians. Mills, supra
note 19, at 23; QUEER NATION, IN YOUR FACE 2 (n.d.).
27. Fox Butterfield, The Uproar at Dartmouth: How a Conservative Weekly Inflamed a
Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, at 15 (citing publication in 1981 by Dartmouth Review of
list of members of school's Gay Students Association); see also Logan v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
466 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1985) (announcing to co-worker that plaintiff was "queer as a three dollar
bill").
28. QUEER NATION, supra note 26, at 2 (describing outing of diver Greg Louganis).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:711

hypocrisy as the primary motivation for outing, 29 others point to the
need to "neturaliz[e] the enemy gay-basher." 3 Still others point to
the gay community's need to provide role models for gay youngsters,31 and the refusal of government officials to fund treatment programs adequately for people with AIDS.3 2 Opinion is even more
divided over the question whether outing is morally defensible. Those
in the gay community who view outing as a political tool to combat
AIDS and homophobia see their action as an affirmative political duty

arising out of an obligation to fellow gay men and women. Outing for
them is not simply a choice between competing alternatives, but an

ethical imperative, akin to a religious conviction.33 Others, primarily
those in the media, view the question as a matter of situational morality, requiring a case-by-case analysis of the particular circumstances,
rather than a per se rule.34 Still others argue that the right to privacy
with respect to matters of sexuality is absolute, and that exposing
someone's sexual orientation is morally wrong, regardless of the

circumstances.35
B.

Homosexuality and Privacy: Social Attitudes

To understand why the debate over outing has aroused so much
controversy, it is helpful to understand something about American

attitudes toward flomosexuality. Until the late 1960s, the majority of
homosexuals chose to keep their sexual lives private in order to avoid

the negative consequences of publicly announcing their sexual orientation.3 6 Most of society viewed homosexuality as abnormal, 37 an
29. Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 6; see also Michelangelo Signorile, The Outing of
Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams, ADVOCATE, Aug. 27, 1991, at 34 (discussing
Williams' role in supporting military policy that deems homosexuality "incompatible" with
military service).
30. Id.
31. Marsha King, Concerned About Privacy as Well as Hypocrisy, Gays and Lesbians
Debate the Practice of "Outing"--How Far Out?, SEATTLE TIMES, June 22, 1990, at Cl.
32. Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 6. Not all gays, however, believe in the outers'
alleged political motivation. "I think a lot of the political reasons (gay leaders] cite [for outing]
are so much bull," said one gay actor who has helped in AIDS funding and education efforts.
Id.
33. Randy Shilts, Is "Outing" Gays Ethical?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1990, at A11.
34. See Mills, supra note 19, at 23-24.
35. Id.
36. There were, of course, some notable exceptions to this rule, among them the English
poet W.H. Auden, playwright Joe Orton, and the novelist Oscar Wilde. For a more
comprehensive list of famous figures who were acknowledged homosexuals, see Valerie
Richardson, Historical Gays May Come out of Closet to Grace School Texts, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1990, at Al.
37. See KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at 31. The linkage of homosexuality to general
mental illness can be traced to the work of early sexologists and psychologists, who believed
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attitude reinforced by the presence of sodomy laws 38 and widespread
social and religious disapprobation. 9
The emergence of a more liberal political climate during the
1960s and 70s, however, prompted attitudes toward homosexuality to
change. Gays launched civil rights campaigns in major metropolitan
areas throughout the nation and demanded "not just tolerance, but
total acceptance."' Homosexuality was no longer considered simply
a question about with whom one slept, but about equal rights to housing, health care, and employment. 41 Attitudes toward gays also
underwent a transformation within the professions during this period.
The American Psychiatric Association shifted its focus away from
trying to make gay people heterosexual to helping them become more
comfortable with their sexuality.42 The roots of homosexual neuroses
were viewed not so much as the result of a person being homosexual
as the product of society's hostility toward homosexuality.
that homosexuality was "inherited as an equivalent of neurosis or psychosis." Id. at 33-34.
Sigmund Freud regarded homosexuality as an inhibition of "normal" psychosexual
development,

KENNETH

LEWES,

THE

PSYCHOANALYTIC

THEORY

OF

MALE

HOMOSEXUALITY 30 (1988), and until very recently, homosexuality was the least mentionable
subject in English-speaking culture, John Boswell, Jews, Bicycle Riders, and Gay People: The
Determination of Social Consensus and Its Impact on Minorities, 1 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 205,
226-27 (1989).
38. KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at 65. Twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia have abolished sodomy statutes. Of the remaining 24, four proscribe homosexual
sodomy, while the others proscribe both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy. Id. However,
the Supreme Court has held that homosexuals have no constitutional right to engage in
consensual homosexual sodomy. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
39. CLARK, supra note 15, at 90. The situation has improved dramatically within the last
ten years. The Washington Blade, a gay newspaper serving Washington, D.C., lists more than
50 social and political organizations, including college alumni associations and support groups
for people with HIV-related illnesses. Nevertheless, institutional prejudice still persists. Most
churches are willing to receive the financial and participatory support of gay congregants, but
insist that they are sinners who are ineligible for leadership as priests, clergymen, or
policymakers. CLARK, supra note 15, at 90. Similarly, although many colleges now "permit"
gay unions to meet on campus, there is little, if any, official support and sanction. Id. at 90.
40. The modern gay movement, as it is known, is usually regarded as beginning with the
street demonstrations in Greenwich Village at the end of June 1969, after the police raided the
Stonewall Bar. The anniversary of that raid, and the resulting activity, is celebrated
internationally as Gay Pride Day. DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF
AMERICA 113 (1982).
41. See RICHARD MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW

(1988).
42. CLARK, supra note 15, at 87. The American Psychiatric Association officially
withdrew homosexuality from its list of emotional disorders in 1973. KIRK & MADSEN, supra
note 14, at 32. Two years later, the American Psychological Association recommended
"removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual
orientation." Id. at 32-33. Similar steps recognizing homosexuality as a normal variation of
human sexuality have also been taken by the American Bar Association, Ellen Simon, YLD
Voices Support for Gay and Lesbian Lawyers, BARRISTER, Winter 1991-1992, at 33, and a
number of major corporations. Stewart, supra note 15, at 42.
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These changes signaled a shift in the way in which many Ameri-

cans viewed homosexuals. People who for decades had regarded
homosexuality as something "voluntary and deliberate" 43 began to
question whether being a homosexual was less a matter of preference

than orientation." Within the gay community, organizational strategies emphasizing self-acceptance and empowerment replaced those
that promoted victimization. 45 The more gays achieved political
acceptability, the more homosexuality became not simply a question
of gay rights, but of human rights, germane to all minorities.4 6
Two other social changes that occurred in the. 1980s caused sexual orientation to take on an increasingly public face. The first, the
AIDS crisis, was responsible for pushing gays out of the closet and
into the halls of Congress, where politicians were forced to grapple
with questions of life and death.4 At the same time that AIDS activists grew more vocal about the government's indifference to people
with AIDS, Americans became increasingly preoccupied with the personal morality of government officials and politicians. Voters who
formerly tolerated the dalliances and private indiscretions of presidents and senators 48 suddenly demanded that politicians be held
43. CLARK, supra note 15, at 87; see also Kirk & Madsen, supra note 14, at 31 (quoting
Midge Decter, The Boys on the Beach, COMMENTARY (1980) (calling homosexuality "a casual
option among options")).
44. Boswell, supra note 37, at 219. For a discussion of whether homosexuality is a chosen
lifestyle or an inborn trait, see Charles Hecker, Broward Bias Vote Tests Public Idea of
Homosexuals, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 2, 1990, at IC; see also MOHR, supra note 41, at 39; Size
of Cell Group in Brain Linked to Homosexuality, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 20, 1991, at Al
(finding the part of the male brain governing sexual urges to be smaller in homosexuals than in
heterosexuals).
45. An excellent example of this is Kirk and Madsen's scheme for a "Madison Avenue"
media campaign, featuring public service ads promoting positive images of gay people in
mainstream situations. KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at 217-45; see also Tom Finkel,
Politics and Power, NEW TIMES, Aug. 14-20, 1991, at 17 (discussing strategies by gay rights
political action committee for mobilizing gays and lesbians and combatting anti-gay violence).
46. See Hecker, supra note 44, at C I.
47. For a comprehensive discussion of the government's response to the AIDS crisis, see
RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (1987).
48. The media's willingness to gratify the public's curiosity about the private lives of
public officials and celebrities is a relatively recent phenomena. HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING
WHAT'S NEWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING NEWS, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK &

TIME 245 (1979). John F. Kennedy, for instance, was notorious for having extra-marital
affairs, yet aside from a report that a woman he was allegedly involved with was linked to
organized crime, the press refused to publish anything about his infidelities. When Time
magazine eventually did publish a story on Kennedy's liaisons in 1976, the piece generated
more letters to the magazine than any other single story, an overwhelming majority of which
were critical of the magazine's decision to publish the article. Id. Similar unwritten rules also
governed the press' refusal to publish information about the sexual affairs and homosexuality
of celebrities. See HUDSON & DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 12.
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accountable for their personal morality.4 9 For opponents of homosexuality, this meant that politicians who led "immoral lives" by engaging in homosexual conduct should be exposed. For homosexuals, it
meant that politicians who conducted their personal lives one way
and voted another not only ran the risk of exposure, but also deserved
to have their actions subjected to searing public scrutiny."0
III.

THE ETHICS OF OUTING

It is in this context, primarily as a response by the gay community to the AIDS crisis, that outing first emerged as a political strategy. Advocates of outing justify their actions on both moral and
utilitarian grounds. Outers argue that forcing gay people out of the
closet is beneficial because it purges the gay community of self-hatred
and homophobia. Studies of gay youths indicate that gays tend to
"internalize negative... images"'" of themselves and often engage in
self-destructive behavior as a result of the negative messages they
receive from society.52 Forcing the media to disclose the sexual orientation of a prominent person not only causes homosexuality to be disthat "your sexual
cussed as a fact, without judgment, but also proves
53
feelings don't make you an automatic loser."
49. See Richard Cohen, It's Nobody's Business but Our Own, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at
A19 (supporting the media's decision to report on Senator Charles Robb's involvement with a
former Miss Virginia). Adultery, drug use, and cheating all caused politicians to lose positions
of public trust during the 1980s. Marjorie Williams, Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism
Has Transformed American Politics, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1991, at 39. Recent political
developments, however, suggest that the media's attempts to expose the private indiscretions of
public figures may be backfiring. Adam Pertman, Clinton Sounds Comeback Theme; Vows to
Keep Fighting Across the Country, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 1992, at 13 (discussing Arkansas
Governor Bill Clinton's second-place finish in the New Hampshire presidential primary,
despite allegations of marital infidelity).
50. "There is little question that a gay U.S. senator who wraps himself in the cloth of a
fundamentalist sect that excoriates homosexuals [and] who votes against or refrains from
taking positions on gay rights legislation... meets the requirement of his homosexuality being
'germane.'" Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, July 28, 1990, at A17.
51. GILBERT HERDT, GAY AND LESBIAN YOUTH 40 (1989).

52. Nearly one in every four lesbians and one in every five gay men who responded to a
1970 survey had attempted to kill themselves at least once during their lives. Well over half of
those attempting suicide for the first time did so because of the unhappiness they felt about
homosexuality and the problems they experienced trying to fit into a hostile world. KIRK &
MADSEN, supra note 14, at 60. Between 20-35% of gay youths have attempted suicide at least
once in their life, HERDT, supra note 51, at 31, a figure confirmed in a recent study conducted
at the University of Minnesota and the University of Washington, Nick Bartolomeo, New
Study Finds High Gay Teen Suicide Rate, WASH. BLADE, June 14, 1991, at 1. Many gay men
also report difficulty forming intimate relationships with other people as a result of social
reprobation, Charles Silverstein, The Doctor is Out, OUTWEEK, June 27, 1990, at 62, and the
absence of role modeling. Peter Lion, Sex and The Single Guy: Gay Dating, Never an Easy
Game to Play, Is More Complicated than Ever, THE ADVOCATE, April 10, 1990, at 46.
53. Michael Musto, La Dolce Musto, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 16, 1991, at 44. The

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:711

Outing also benefits gays because it helps combat the false myths
and stereotypes many heterosexuals have about gay people.5 4
Whereas racial and ethnic minorities can distinguish themselves by
their skin color, language, and other physical traits, most gay people
remain invisible to the world unless they fit one of society's stereotypes. 5 Outing also can be defended on communitarian notions of
social justice and responsibility. In the same way that government
imposes certain obligations on its citizens by virtue of their membership in the political community,5 6 "[o]uting presupposes that all [people] who engage in primarily homosexual conduct . . . owe a
minimum obligation to gay society ... to come out [of the closet]. ' 57
Such obligations arise even in the case of homosexuals who do not
participate actively in gay life to the extent that they benefit from the
58
political activism of their more outspoken counterparts.
Finally, outing provides young gay people with badly needed role
models. The entertainment and sports worlds boast of Virtually no
publicly acknowledged homosexuals, 59 and when admired gay figures
do come out of the closet, the public often shuns them, or denies their
argument that outing homosexuals helps destigmatize homosexuality has been applied by
analogy in the debate over whether the media should be allowed to publish the names of rape
victims. Professor Dershowitz, among others, argues that the policy of singling out rape
victims for special treatment by the media helps foster sexist stereotypes and perpetuates the
popular conception of rape victims as "damaged goods" who have "asked for it." Dershowitz,
supra note 6, at Cl.
54. Most antigay stereotypes revolve around alleged mistakes in an individual's gender
identity (e.g., "lesbians are women who want to act like men") and the perception of gays as
pervasive, sinister, conspiratorial, and corruptive. MOHR, supra note 41, at 22-23. The seven
"hallowed public myths of homosexuality" cited by Kirk and Madsen, are: (1) gays are hardly
worth thinking about; (2) gays are few in number; (3) gays are easy to spot; (4) homosexuality
results from sin, insanity, or seduction; (5) homosexuals are kinky, loathsome sex addicts; (6)
homosexuals are unproductive and untrustworthy members of society; and (7) homosexuals
are suicidally unhappy. KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at 61.
55. Indeed, many, including the Supreme Court, maintain that gays are not truly "discrete
and insular minorities." Richardson, supra note 36, at Al. For more on the burden of being
an invisible minority, see KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at 73-97; and CLARK, supra note
15, at 92.
56. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 180 (1982).

57. Gabriel Rotello, Out of the Closet & Into the Fray: Should Gay Politicians and
Celebrities Be Forced to "Come Out?", ON THE ISSUES, Fall 1990, at 23.
58. Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 6 ("By not saying you're homosexual .... you're
a co-conspirator in gay oppression").

59. KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at 11. The role model argument has been advanced
by actors in two television shows that featured segments on outing, L.A. Law and Gabriel's
Fire, as well as a number of publicly prominent gay celebrities. Terry Sweeney, an
unabashedly gay cast member of NBC's Saturday Night Live, speaks for many gays when he
says, "One little name [of a prominent gay person] would have made all the difference in the
world to me." Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 6.
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homosexuality. 6° Since concealing a person's sexuality is "never
merely a sin of omission, [but] requires active lying to cover up a gay
person's sexuality,"'" refusing to discuss the sexual orientation of public figures is itself tantamount to the oppression of homosexuals.62
Nevertheless, there are those in the gay community who believe
that forcing someone to come out against his will is not only psychologically damaging to the outed individual, but also to the community
at large. For most gay people, acknowledging their homosexuality is
probably "one of the biggest events in [their lives]." 63 The decision
can take months, sometimes years, and often involves the letting go of
illusions about leading a "normal life." 6" Persons unwilling or unable
to accept their homosexuality may suffer serious damage to their selfesteem if forced to come out before they are ready, and ultimately
may retreat even further into the closet.6 5
Even if outing someone could be argued to be psychologically
beneficial, it is not without its social and professional hazards. The
possibility of separation from family 66 and friends 67 is very real, as is
60. Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 88. One closeted gay actor noted: "If the public
knows you're gay, it has a whole different perception of you.... All you have to do is look at
the movies Rock Hudson made, and ask yourself, would he have gotten to make those movies
if the town and the country had known that he was gay? The answer is, of course not." Id. at
6, 88; see also DAVE PALLONE & ALAN STEINBERG, BEHIND THE MASK: My DOUBLE LIFE

IN BASEBALL (1990). The absence of role models has been linked to high rates of drug and
alcohol abuse among homosexuals, as well as high incidences of teenage suicide. See HERDT,
supra note 51, at 40.
61. Rotello, supra note 57, at 23. Rotello, in fact, suggests that what outing really involves
is not "dragging someone out of the closet," but equalizing homosexuality and heterosexuality
in the media. Gabriel Rotello, Why I Oppose Outing, OUTWEEK, May 29, 1991, at 10.
62. Eleanor Randolph, The Media, At Odds Over "Outing" of Gays; Deciding Whether to
Publish Names of Alleged Homosexuals, WASH. POST, July 13, 1990, at Cl; see also Musto,
supra note 53, at 44.
63. King, supra note 31, at Cl.
64. CLARK, supra note 15, at 98-99. Typically, closeted gay people find themselves having
homosexual encounters and yet, at least initially, resisting quite strongly the identification of
being a homosexual. Only with time, luck, and great personal effort does the person gradually,
if ever, come to accept her sexual orientation as a given material condition of life. MOHR,
supra note 41, at 40.
65. M. SCOTT PECK, THE ROAD LESS TRAVELLED 61 (1978). One publicly gay journalist
expressed his feelings on the matter this way: "As a gay man myself, who has chosen his own
time and place to come out, I realize how devastating it would be to be exposed when you're
not ready." Mills, supra note 19, at 25.
66. CLARK, supra note 15, at 74. Anecdotes abound of gay men and women disowned by
their families for disclosing their homosexuality. In the case of Oliver Sipple, the gay exmarine who achieved notoriety after saving former President Gerald Ford from an assassin, see
discussion infra part IV, the estrangement between Sipple and his father was so deep that when
his mother died in 1979 Sipple was not welcome at the funeral in his father's presence. Dan
Morain, Sorrow Traileda Veteran Who Sowed a Presidentand Then Was Cast in an Unwanted
Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1989, at El.
67. CLARK, supra note 15, at 134.
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the emotional trauma which often accompanies disclosure. 6 The
association of gays with AIDS exacerbates the problem, particularly
in fields where the perception of health-related risks is great.69
On a more abstract level, forcing homosexuals out of the closet
violates their right to personal autonomy. 70 For many homosexuals,
being gay means the right to choose whom one loves, without interference from the outside world. Violating a person's autonomy is more
than simply a taking of his right; it is a violation of the "inviolate
personality" 71 that defines who he is as a human being. 72 Finally, outing can be objected to on the ground that it erodes the democratic
process by trivializing speech. Because gossip " 'obliterate[s] the vital
distinction between what is private and what is public' and thereby
trivializes all that is inward and inherently inexpressible, ' 73 idle talk
about a person's sexuality-absent a compelling political justification-is socially destructive.
IV.

OUTING AND COMMON LAW PRIVACY

Given the stigma attached to homosexuality, it is not surprising
that relatively few actions against outers have made their way through
the legal system. Most of the cases that have been filed have been
dismissed, either for failure to state a claim, 7 ' or in the case of defamation, for failure to prove the falsity of the allegations."
Those who have brought actions have relied on four principal
68. Broeske & Wilson, supra note 23, at 90. One Hollywood manager who lost her
longtime partner to an AIDS-related disease believes that "this whole [outing thing] is going to
culminate in someone being so pained they'll commit suicide or do something equally
desperate." Id.
69. Despite reassurances by the Surgeon General that AIDS does not discriminate, the
belief that AIDS is a "gay" disease still persists. KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at 25.
Tabloids have made fortunes from articles with headlines such as "Gay Terror Group Vows:
'We're Going to Infect Everyone With AIDS'" and "Vengeful AIDS Victim Infects 50 Gays
in 2 Weeks." Id. at 51. Numbers of people have responded by calling for mandatory HIV
testing of health care workers. Woman Set to Take Up Bergalis'AIDS Fight, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Dec. 10, 1991, at 3.
70. SCHEPPELE, supra note 7, at 181.
71. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205. Many gays also point to the communitarian
values violated by forced disclosure-specifically, the severing of the bond that holds gay
people together as a community.
72. C. Carr, Why Outing Must Stop, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 19, 1991, at 37.
73. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 90 (1983) (quoting SOREN KIERKEGAARD, Two AGES
(1846)).
74. See, e.g., Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, (Ala. 1985); Sipple v.
Chronicle Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
75. See, e.g., Logan, 466 So. 2d at 123; cf Daily v. Orange County Publications, 497
N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Div. 1986) (deputy sheriff identified in personal ad as homosexual had no
cause of action against newspaper, since he was unable to prove actual malice).
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theories to recover: (1) defamation; (2) invasion of privacy; (3) tortious interference with business relations; and (4) violation of statutes
and ordinances which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 76 This Comment focuses on invasion of privacy.
A.

Invasion of Privacy

The common law tort of invasion of privacy traces its origins to
1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published "The Right
to Privacy"7 7 in the Harvard Law Review. Since the publication of
Warren and Brandeis' article, rights of privacy have been recognized
in some form in every jurisdiction in the United States but Rhode
Island. 78 Most follow Professor Prosser's four-part scheme, which
allows recovery for intrusion upon solitude or seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, publicity that places another in a false light, or
76. Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia are among the jurisdictions
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Massachusetts statute
provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful practice: 1.For an employer, by himself or his agent,
because of the race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation,
which shall not include persons whose sexual orientation involves minor children
as the sex object, or ancestry of any individual to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against
such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.
MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (Supp. 1991); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (1988);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502 (1990).
77. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193. In the article, the authors identify the
contours of what they call the right "to be let alone." "[Those] matters which ought to be
repressed," wrote Warren and Brandeis, are those which "concern the private life, habits, acts,
and relations of an individual, and have no legitimate connection with his fitness for a public
office.., or any public or quasi public position which he seeks or for which he is suggested."
Id. at 216. The authors add that despite their role in society, "some things all men alike are
entitled to keep from popular curiosity, whether in public life or not." Id.
Warren and Brandeis based their cause of action on a theory of "inviolate personality"
rather than private property. To Warren, whose effort was partly a response to the media's
meddling in his own affairs, gossip was particularly invidious because it appealed to "that weak
side of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our
neighbors." Id. at 196. Gossip was also dangerous because it distracted the public,
"crowd[ing] the space available for matters of real interest to the community," and causing the
"ignorant and thoughtless [to] mistake its relative importance." Id. In the authors' minds,
plaintiffs whose privacy was invaded by the media suffered "far greater [intrusions] than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury." Id.
78. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117, at 851 (5th ed.
1984). New York, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Nebraska recognize only a
limited right to privacy. Id.; see also Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort,
Inc., 408 A.2d 608 (R.I. 1979) (holding that the creation of an action for individual privacy is a
matter properly for the legislature, not the courts).
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appropriation of name or likeness for the actor's benefit.79
Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates the
elements necessary to bring a cause of action foi public disclosure of
private facts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.8 0
The scope of the action is limited by the Supreme Court's decisions in
two First Amendment cases that bar recovery for publicity of8 2facts
which are lawfully obtained8" or are a matter of public record.
B.

Is Sex a Private Fact?

Much of the controversy surrounding the tort centers around the
difficulty inherent in defining the term private facts.8 3 In order for the
79. Prosser's formulation has been widely accepted by courts and adopted by the
American Law Institute. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 1985).
80. Technically, the plaintiff need not allege the facts were of legitimate public concern,
since lack of newsworthiness is not an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. However, to
survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege that: 1) the defendant gave publicity to
facts about the plaintiff; 2) the facts were private within the meaning of the tort; and 3) the
publicity of the facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
See id.
81. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). The Court in FloridaStar confronted the
question whether a newspaper could be held liable for publishing the name of a rape victim
that was obtained from the press room of a county sheriff's department. Department police
did not restrict access either to the press room or to its records. Id. at 526. The Court held
that the plaintiff had no cause of action, since the facts published were both truthful and
lawfully obtained by the newspaper. Id. at 541. The Court stopped short, however, of
imposing an absolute bar on recovery for the publication of truthful facts which are lawfully
obtained. Justice Marshall wrote for the majority:
We do not hold that truthful publication is
Our holding today is limited ....
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the
press, or even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a victim
of a sexual offense. We hold only where a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may be lawfully
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest
order ....

Id.
82. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The plaintiff in Cox Broadcasting,the
father of a 17-year-old rape victim, alleged that his privacy was invaded when a television
station broadcast the name of his daughter. Id. at 474. The reporter responsible for the
broadcast had obtained the information from the indictments which were made available in the
courtroom. Id. at 472-74. The Court held that because the indictments were public records
available for inspection, the plaintiff had no cause of action.
83. For a discussion of this problem, see Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 333-34 (1966).
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tort of public disclosure of private facts to have any meaning, there
must be facts that are "private" within the meaning of the tort. Yet to
assert that facts exist that are by their very nature private begs the
question of which facts and why. 4 Although the Restatement suggests that certain matters, such as those concerning sexual relations,
are normally considered private,"5 it is unclear what differentiates
these matters from other "public" facts.
There are several reasons why matters involving sexual relations
ought to be considered private. First, unlike rituals governing modes
of eating or dress, rituals protecting sexual privacy have existed across
time 6 and culture.8 7 Second, in contrast to activities that gain their
meaning through exposure to other people, sex is intended to be
"world excluding."8 8 Perhaps most important, because sexual exploration is largely a process of self-discovery and self-definition, 9 people
ought to be free to define themselves as they choose without the interference of others. 9°
Yet labeling all matters concerning sex as private raises obvious
definitional and sociological problems. Few today, for instance,
would suppose that a conspicuously pregnant woman out in public
has somehow violated the requirement of sexual privacy that society
places over sexual performances, though most would make the simple
inference that she has had sex. 91 Nor would anyone consider the fact
that thousands of women are raped every year to be a "private fact,"
although they might well consider the details of the rape or the vic84. The comment to the Restatement attempts to clarify the definition of private facts by
negative and positive example. Facts which are a matter of public record, which the plaintiff
leaves open to the public eye, and which have already been published are not considered

private. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). Conversely, those facts
which a person "keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close
friends" are normally considered private. Sexual relations are ordinarily considered private
matters, as are family quarrels, humiliating illnesses, personal letters, and certain parts of a
person's past history. Id.
85. Id.
86. MOHR, supra note 41, at 95. Customs regarding eating in public, for instance, have
radically liberalized within one generation of Americans, while illness, death, and perhaps
birth are becoming increasingly private matters here. Id.
87. Id. The provision that women in some Muslim countries must wear veils to cover
their faces in public is not only viewed as impractical, but sexist, by many Westerners. By
contrast, sexual privacy is considered universally desirable, even though in some cultures
privacy is sought in the wild rather than in the home. Id.
88. Id. at 100.
89. Id. at 106-14.
90. SCHEPPELE, supra note 7, at 181-82 (quoting Edward Bloustein). Without the ability
to withhold some thoughts and inclinations from the scrutiny of others, Scheppele argues that
a person would "merge with the mass." Id.
91. MOHR, supra note 41, at 98.
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tim's identity private,92 particularly if they were members of the vic-

tim's family. In other words, whether sex is a private matter depends
less on the fact that sex is involved, than on the context of the situation and the expectations of the parties.9 a
In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. ,a the Court of Appeal for

the First District of California addressed the issue whether sexual orientation constituted a private fact within the meaning of the tort. The
plaintiff in Sipple, a gay ex-Marine, was inadvertently thrust into the
public limelight when he struck Sara Jane Moore in the arm as she
attempted to assassinate President Gerald Ford." Although it is
unclear whether Sipple actually saved Ford's life, Sipple was considered a hero and achieved notoriety in a column in the San Francisco
Chronicle.9 6 The column, which alluded to Sipple's sexual orientation, 97 was later picked up by numerous out-of-state newspapers,
which mentioned that he was gay. 98 Sipple sued the Chronicle, the
columnist responsible for the statement, and the other newspapers for
invasion of privacy. 99
The court of appeal found that although Sipple initially may
have enjoyed an expectation of privacy in his sexual orientation, he
forfeited any rights he may have had arising under that expectation by
placing his sexual orientation in the public domain.i°° As support for
92. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 545 (White, J., dissenting); see also David Zeman
& Don Van Natta, Jr., Tabloid's Ethics in Rape Story Questioned, MIAMI HERALD, April 16,
1991, at 1 (discussing newspaper's decision to publish the name of the alleged rape victim in
the William Kennedy Smith trial).
93. A contextual approach to evaluating privacy rights is by no means confined to matters
concerning sexual privacy. Judge Wiseman of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee, writing about the activities of union organizers vis-i-vis their employers,
noted, "An individual who enters a private meeting he has a legitimate right to expect that
others will not eavesdrop on his meeting," but when he parks his car in a public place on the
street he has "no right to expect that persons passing by on the street will not take note."
International Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
94. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
95. Id. at 666.
96. Id.
97. The article read:
"One of the heroes of the day, Oliver 'Bill' Sipple, the ex-Marine who grabbed
Sara Jane Moore's arm just as her gun was fired and thereby may have saved the
President's life, was the center of midnight attention at the Red Lantern, a
Golden Gate Ave. bar he favors. The Rev. Ray Broshears, head of Helping
Hands, and Gay Politico, Harvey Milk, who claim to be among Sipple's close
friends, describe themselves as 'proud-maybe this will help break the
stereotype.' Sipple is among the workers in Milk's campaign for [City]
Supervisor."

Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 667.
100. Id. at 669.
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this proposition, the court noted that Sipple had "spent a lot of time
in 'Tenderloin' and 'Castro,'" [well-known gay sections of San Francisco], that he frequented gay bars "and other homosexual gatherings

in San Francisco and other cities," that he marched in gay parades,
and that his homosexual association and name had been reported in
gay magazines."'o Since Sipple "did not make a secret"'' 0 2 of his being
a homosexual, the court reasoned it would be illogical for him to

claim that publication of the fact violated his right to privacy. 0 3
The Sipple opinion is noteworthy because of the way in which the

court dealt with the issue of private facts. Although the court held
that Sipple had no cause of action because "the facts disclosed were
not private,"" 4 it did not hold that sexual orientation could never,
under any circumstances, be deemed a private fact within the meaning of the tort. Rather, the court maintained that when a person's

sexual orientation is held open to the public eye, it necessarily loses

the essence of its "privateness."'' 0 5 Such a framework is consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Florida Star v. B.J.F ,'6 which
suggests that no fact, however private or embarrassing, would automatically be shielded from publication. 0 7

The Sipple court's opinion, however, fails to address the more
difficult question of when sexual orientation should be considered a

private fact. It is unclear from the test the court applies in Sipple
whether all of the facts cited by the court collectively caused Sipple to
forfeit his right of privacy, or if any one piece of evidence, by itself,
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. With regard to the other media defendants, the court held that no right of privacy
attaches to a matter of general interest that already has been publicly released in a periodical
or newspaper of local or regional circulation. Id.
104. Id. at 668.
105. The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122,
1128 (9th Cir. 1975). In Virgil, the plaintiff, a body surfer at one of the world's most
dangerous sites for body surfing, sued Sports Illustrated for publishing an interview in which
embarrassing facts about his past were revealed. Id. at 1123. Although the plaintiff originally
consented to the interview, he withdrew his consent once he learned that the article would not
be limited to his prominence as a surfer. Id. at 1124.
In determining whether the facts disclosed were private, the Ninth Circuit conducted a
two-part inquiry. First, the court needed to ascertain whether the information was generally
known, and second, whether the disclosure was made to the public at large. Id. at 1126. The
court remanded the case to the district court to determine among other things, whether private
facts respecting Virgil as a prominent member of the group engaged in body surfing were
matters in which the public had a legitimate interest, and whether the identity of Virgil as the
one to whom such facts applied was a matter in which the public had a legitimate interest. Id.
at 1131.
106. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
107. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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was responsible for tipping the scales in favor of disclosure. 108

Another way of addressing this problem is to ask what would have
happened if Sipple had been less public about his homosexuality.
Suppose, for instance, Sipple had subscribed to several gay news
magazines, but only infrequently visited gay bars. Would his sexual
orientation still have been regarded as "public"? What about his
"close friendship" with Harvey Milk, an openly gay politician?
Had Sipple participated in a gay pride parade, it is easy to see
why he would have forfeited his right to privacy, at least within the
confines of his neighborhood. After all, parades are intended as
media events, designed to attract public attention. Those on display
expect they will be seen by others, especially when, as in Sipple's case,
their purpose is to make a political statement. 1°9 Frequenting a gay
bar, on the other hand, involves a qualitatively different level of public
exposure. Although patrons of a bar normally could not be said to
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, 10° for many homosexuals,
gay establishments represent a refuge--often the sole refuge-from
the heterosexual world.''
Moreover, even if Sipple disclosed his homosexuality to his close
friends and those in the gay community, it does not follow that he
necessarily intended for his homosexuality to be disclosed in other
areas of his life. "In a society in which multiple, often conflicting role
performances are demanded of people," many individuals choose to
keep parts of themselves hidden from all but those with whom they
108. One author suggests that Sipple is of little help in determining whether future plaintiffs
can maintain a cause of action for outing because "the facts .. .were so unfavorable to the
plaintiff." Ronald F. Wick, Note, Out of the Closet and into the Headlines: "Outing" and the
Private Facts Tort, 80 GEO. L.J. 413, 421 (1991).
109. Indeed, to hold participation in a parade private would be incongruous, in light of the
nature of the event.
110. See, e.g., International Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (no
legitimate expectation of privacy where persons passing by on the street may take note of
activity). Wick, in fact, suggests that courts should adopt a Fourth Amendment approach to
the question of privacy. Wick, supra note 108, at 428.
111. One of the primary reasons for the existence of exclusively gay establishments and
publications, in fact, is to protect homosexuals from being identified by friends and family
members as gay. Many homosexuals do not feel comfortable being seen with other
homosexuals in public, or fear being victims of physical or verbal abuse. See Finkel, supra note
45, at 20. Moreover, the standards for behavior in exclusively gay establishments are different
from those in places that cater to a mixed clientele. Behavior that might be considered
perfectly acceptable in a gay bar-for example, holding hands with a same-sex partner-might
well result, in another context, in jeers, and even physical violence. Id. Like members of a
private club, most patrons of gay bars go with the expectation that their privacy will be
protected. To assume otherwise would negate one of the primary reasons such establishments
exist in the first place.
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are most intimate. 12 A closeted homosexual might be willing to risk
subscribing to a gay newsmagazine delivered to his home in a plain
brown envelope (assuming the magazine's mailing list was kept confidential), but would probably not keep a picture of his lover on his
13
desk at work, where the chances of someone seeing it are greater.
Even within the confines of the gay community itself, a person
might draw lines about behavior he felt to be "safe" and "unsafe"
based on the probability of being exposed by others. Sipple, for
instance, was willing to risk being seen by friends at a gay bar in San
Francisco, while maintaining a cloak-and-dagger facade during visits
to his parents' home in Detroit.' 14 As the California Supreme Court
put it, the claim presented is not so much one of total secrecy, as it is
"the right to define one's circle of intimacy [and to be able] to choose
who shall see beneath the quotidian mask."'' 5
Beyond the practical difficulties posed by forcing plaintiffs to
shield their sexuality from the public, labeling sexual orientation private raises other problems. Although sex is regarded by most people
as a private act, sexuality and gender necessarily derive their meaning
from how we see ourselves in relation to the rest of the world. 1 6 A
woman who dresses in dainty clothes and plays up her attraction to
men is considered coquettish only in relation to other, less flirtatious
women. A person labeled sexually dominant earns the distinction
only in relation to some other, less aggressive partner.
Characterizing sexual orientation as purely private also fails to
take into account the experiential nature of sexuality. Although many
gay men and lesbians know that they are gay without actually having
sex, 1 17 for many people sexual orientation evolves over time. People
may at one time in their lives marry and have children, then later on
change direction and explore homosexual relationships." 8 Indeed, to
112. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971). The facts that one
would disclose to an employer or a co-worker, for instance, may not be the same as those one
might reveal to a neighbor or a pastor.
113. Indeed, that same individual might not even subscribe to the magazine if it were

delivered unveiled to his residence or directly to his workplace.
114. Morain, supra note 66, at El.
115. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 37.
116. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 7-23 (1982) (discussing how men and

women form gender identities based on socially constructed roles). See also Jeb Rubenfeld,
The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 758 (1989) (arguing that there is no such thing as a
truly "self-regarding" act, since there are always indirect, unintended effects that result from a
person's conduct if "the causal sequence is carried far enough along").
117. CLARK, supra note 15, at 79. Many homosexuals claim to have known they were gay
during their childhood, long before their first sexual experience. SHERE HITE, THE HITE
832-47 (1981).
118. Id. at 81. Alternatively, an equal number of individuals have explored homosexual

REPORT ON MALE SEXUALITY

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:711

the extent that a person's sexual orientation is a product of exploration and experimentation-an assumption some psychologists believe
to be true' " 9-a person's sexual orientation can never be a purely private matter.
Even if it were possible to confine sexuality to the four walls of a
person's bedroom, it is politically and socially naive to think that the
relationships which grow out of that sexuality are capable of being
kept purely private. Our clothes, our way of speaking, and our manner of interacting with others all make up our sexuality, and how we
choose to express it. The manner in which two people hold themselves out to the public is often as much an indicator of how intimate
their relationship is as the number of times a week they have sex
together.' 2 0 Although some people may genuinely believe that they
"do not need any superfluous laws to safeguard [their sex lives] from
anybody or anything,"' 121 the vast majority of society would likely
find such a compartmentalization of life both unrealistic and
22
undesirable. 1
Finally, characterizing sexuality as purely private hinders our
ability to establish intimate, trusting relationships with others. Part
of what makes people close to one another involves the sharing of
information about one's relationships and life experience, including
information about significant relationships. 123 True, people select
what they choose to share, and with whom, and not all acts involving
sexual expression ought to be publicly revealed. But to suggest that
relationships at one point in their lives, then gone on later to pursue heterosexual relationships.
Neil R. Tuller, Couples: The Hidden Segment of the Gay World, in GAY RELATIONSHIPS 45
(John P. Dececco ed., 1988). Most studies of the gay community have concentrated almost
exclusively on homosexuals vis-a-vis homosexual institutions, such as gay bars and baths. Gay
couples are a less visible portion of the gay community and cannot always be found in the
conventional meeting places of most homosexuals. Id.
119. See C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 35 (1987) (noting that the correlation
between what people do in their early sex-play and what sexual orientation they eventually
adopt is "very uneven"); HITE, supra note 117, at 809 (discussing Kinsey's theory of a
continuum of sexuality).
120. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (life partner of deceased gay
man deemed "family member" for purposes of rent control statute).
121. Charles Whited, Readers React to Column on Gay Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 1,
1990, at BI (quoting anonymous letter writer).
122. Wick, supra note 108, at 427.
123. Marc A. Fajer, Can Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal ProtectionforGay Men and Lesbians, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1991);
see also GILLIGAN, supra note 116, at 24-63 (differentiating between male and female styles of
interacting); HARRIET G. LERNER, THE DANCE OF ANGER 119 (1985) (arguing that one of
the ways women gain a clearer sense of themselves is by talking in depth with their mothers
about their family history); DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN
AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990) (drawing distinctions between way in which men and
women use language to form relationships).

1992]

LEGAL DILEMMA OF "OUTING"

sexuality is something which can or ought to be kept completely private, like a diary locked away in a closet, is to distort the very notion
of what it means to be a human being. When we cut off significant
parts of ourselves-perhaps the most significant part of ourselves-we
rob not only ourselves, but also others, of the opportunity to connect.
Our lives lose their richness and meaning, and ultimately become
substanceless.
The question whether sexual orientation is a private fact in the
context of a privacy action, then, seems misplaced. When a person's
sexual orientation sufficiently affects the lives of others so that it
becomes "newsworthy," sex can no more be considered a "private
fact" than hair color, or the kind of car one drives. When, however, a
person's sexual orientation is of no legitimate concern to others,
beyond a mere prurient interest, courts should consider sexual orientation to be a private fact.
C. Is Outing Highly Offensive to a Reasonable Person
of Ordinary Sensibilities?
Assuming that in certain instances sexual orientation ought to be
regarded by courts as a private fact, a more difficult and politically
volatile question is whether the publication of a person's sexual orientation is highly offensive to the reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. "24
' To answer this question, a court must address two related
questions: first, whether saying that the publicity of a person's homosexuality is highly offensive is the same thing as saying that homosexuality is highly offensive; and second, whether the harm suffered by
gay people as a result of courts' labeling the publicity of homosexuality "highly offensive" is greater than the harm suffered by the victim
of an outing. Much of the opposition to finding the publicity of a
person's homosexuality highly offensive comes, not surprisingly, from
within the gay community. Those who argue against taking such a
position believe that language and ideas heavily influence culture and
self-image, and that how people perceive homosexuals is tied directly
to how they are treated by the media and other social institutions. 2 5
124. In Logan, the court took pains to point out the distinction between what would be
offensive to the ordinary homosexual of reasonable sensibilities and ordinary people, regardless
of their sexual orientation. Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 124 (Ala. 1985).
Logan argued that the plaintiff's statement, "This guy is as queer as a three dollar bill," would
be highly offensive to the ordinary person. The Logan court disagreed, however, concluding
that while the ordinary gay person might find the epithet "queer" highly offensive when
applied to homosexuals, it was not a term which the ordinary person would find highly
offensive, particularly if he admitted, as Logan did, to being a homosexual. Id. at 123.
125. See, e.g., Rotello, supra note 61, at 10-11. Similar arguments have been made by
leaders of the black community and other minority groups to explain the surge of inner-city
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As long as the law continues to reinforce the notion that being homosexual is "bad" or "offensive," they maintain, gay people will con1 26
tinue to suffer institutional and psychological oppression.
There is no doubt that adopting such a position is moral, and
that institutions do, in a profound way, shape our perceptions of ourselves. Indeed, many people who oppose outing are themselves active
advocates of institutional reform. Nevertheless, believing that society
shapes self-perception does not automatically translate into adopting
politically naive positions. In relying on changes in language and the
media to cure the problem of homophobia, institutional reformers
place the burden to help combat bigotry where it rightly belongs--on
institutions. But in doing so, they also deny the extent to which
1 27
homophobia exists and the rate at which social change occurs.
Removing homosexuality from the legal system's list of "offensive"
disclosures may send a message to gays that the legal system is on
their side, but it also may make it easier for bigots to oppress gays and
lesbians by taking away one of the few legal weapons gay people have
at their disposal.

28

It is tempting to argue that because people are more aware of
homosexuality today than they were twenty years ago they are less
shocked by it. But the reality is that homophobia does exist in today's
violence and black-on-black crime. D. Marvin Jones, Rioters Come to Give Verdict of Their
Own, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 1992, at 6C.
126. The paradox of this position, of course, is that if taken to its logical extreme, it would
deny gays any preferential treatment to make up for past discrimination. Cf Dershowitz,
supra note 6, at Cl (attacking media's policy of withholding names of rape victims from
publication on grounds that it perpetuates harmful stereotypes).
127. See infra notes 129 & 131 and accompanying text.
128. A related question courts have had to contend with in this area is whether the
imputation of homosexual behavior constitutes slander per se. In Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361
N.E.2d 74 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977), the court held that a manager's calling a nightclub singer a
"fag" at a corporate meeting did not constitute slander per se. Id. at 75. The court cited the
"changing temper of the times" and the fact that calling someone a homosexual did not
necessarily import the commission of a crime as the basis for its decision. Id. at 76. Other
jurisdictions, however, have taken a more pragmatic approach to the issue. See Matherson v.
Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1005 (App. Div. 1984) (stating that increasing number of
homosexuals publicly expressing satisfaction and pride with their status fails to outweigh "the
potential and probable harm of a false charge of homosexuality, in terms of social and
economic impact"); see also Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (letter
identifying students as members of "gay community" defamatory even though sodomy was no
longer crime in New York). The contemporary tendency among most jurisdictions today is to
shy away from recognizing the imputation of homosexuality as slander per se in part because it
is no longer fashionable in political circles to be openly homophobic, but also because as the
gay community becomes more visible and achieves greater political power, the stigma attached
to homosexuality considerably diminishes. Cf Sipple v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr.
665, 670 (Ct. App. 1984) (statement that ex-marine in San Francisco was a homosexual was
not highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities).
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society, 1 29 and that attending a gay rights rally is not regarded by the
public in the same vein as "going camping in the woods, or giving a
party at home for friends." 13 0 Those who feel differently should ask

themselves how they would feel announcing to their co-workers over
the water cooler at work that they spent the weekend in Key West
with their lover attending a gay rights rally. Would the reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities feel uncomfortable revealing this information? Would the average co-worker feel uncomfortable receiving
that information?
Furthermore, even if most people today are more aware of homosexuality than they were twenty years ago, that does not necessarily
mean that they are more tolerant, or less offended by it.' 3 ' To deny
the existence of prejudice because acknowledging it seems politically
incorrect does a disservice to society and robs homosexuals of the
very instrument of power many require to defend themselves.' 3 2
129. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 15, at 43; Vicki Quade, The Struggle to Be a Gay Lawyer,
Winter 1991-1992, at 29. In a recent survey of students at Harvard and Stanford
University, 82% said they believed that homosexuality was an "inferior lifestyle." KIRK &
MADSEN, supra note 14, at 59.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
131. Fifty-two percent of respondents to a Roper Survey said they prefer not to work with
gays, including 25% who "strongly object." Twenty-two percent believe it should be
completely legal "to keep people out of jobs and housing if they are homosexuals." Thirty-five
percent admit that they are "uncomfortable around gays," and 33% avoid places "where
homosexuals may be present." Forty-nine percent say they have reason to believe that "AIDS
is causing unfair discrimination against all homosexuals." KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 14, at
82. In Broward County, Florida, where an estimated 25% of the population is gay, a vote to
adopt a human rights amendment which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation failed by 60%. Steve Bousquet, BrowardSays No to Gay-Rights Protection, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 5, 1990, at Al.
132. Assuming a court did find the publication of a person's homosexuality to be highly
offensive, it would still have to determine what standard of offensiveness to apply. It is
tempting to argue that the question of offensiveness is one that ought properly to be couched in
geographic terms, since it involves matters of cultural norms that vary from region to region.
See Wick, supra note 108, at 425 (noting that the Supreme Court has defined "community
mores" in the obscenity context as the mores of the local community for purposes of the
newsworthiness defense). Under this standard, the proper inquiry would not be whether the
publication would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities, but rather whether the
publication would be highly offensive, say, to a reasonable San Francisco resident of ordinary
sensibilities.
In theory, such a test of reasonableness appears to be more equitable than a national
standard since it takes into account regional differences in cultural attitudes and exposure.
Certainly in a city such as San Francisco, where a sizeable minority of the population is
homosexual and a number of homosexuals hold public office, the disclosure that someone is a
homosexual would be less "shocking" than if it were made in a small town in Nebraska. But
as the Sipple case points out, emotional distress cannot be confined to a specific geographic
radius. In a highly mobile society such as ours, it is common for people to move and change
careers several times within a decade-a reality likely to become even more pronounced as the
economy becomes more global.
Even if it could be argued that an individual's reputation could be confined to a particular
BARRISTER,

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:711

To argue in favor of a cause of action for outing is not to say that
homosexuality is highly offensive. Nor is it to deny the very real damage done to the self-esteem of gay people, both in the closet and out,
each time courts reinforce the notion that the publicity of someone's
homosexuality is any different from the publicity of their annual
income, or where they spend their summer vacations. Rather, it is to
acknowledge that society still is far from fully accepting homosexuality, and that until it does, gay people who choose to keep their sexual
orientation private need protection from those who would use sexual
orientation as a weapon to harm others.13 3
D.

The "Newsworthiness" Privilege

The plaintiff's ability to satisfy the elements of a cause of action
for invasion of privacy, however, does not end the court's inquiry.
Because the cause of action is subject to the newsworthiness privilege,
it is also necessary to look at the standards for newsworthiness established by the common law and the Supreme Court to determine when
an outed party has a realistic chance of prevailing.
Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts mirrors the
language of the Supreme Court's opinions in Cox BroadcastingCo. v.
Cohn 134 and Florida Star v. B.J.F I35 The comment to 652D notes
that the constitutional definition of matters of legitimate public concern controls when the constitutional definition is broader than that
of any state. 136 However, the Restatement limits the media's "breathing space" to those matters that respect the customs and mores of the
community. 3 7 Thus, even though some statements may satisfy the
constitutional requirements for newsworthiness, when the publicity is
geographic radius, the Sipple case demonstrates the danger of focusing too narrowly on the
damage outing does to the individual. Sipple's concern was not with what the average person
in San Francisco thought about his being gay, but with what his parents and relatives back
home in Detroit would think if they found out. Precisely because cultural norms differ from
region to region, and information is so easily disseminated without attention to those
differences, any standard of reasonableness in matters concerning sexual orientation would
need to be governed by a certain amount of uniformity.
133. By offering this caveat, I do not mean to discourage gay people from coming out. On
the contrary, gays and lesbians should seize every opportunity, to the extent possible, to come
out to others, because only by doing so will attitudes towards homosexuality change. I simply
mean to point out that not everyone is similarly situated, and that what may be beneficial for
one person may, under certain circumstances, be disastrous for another.
134. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
135. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).

137. "[I]n the last analysis," the authors note, "[tihe line is to be drawn when the publicity
ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid
and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, which a reasonable member of the
public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern." Id. cmt. h.
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so offensive as to shock community standards of decency, the statements are nevertheless outside the scope of the privilege." a '
1.

HOMOSEXUALITY AND NEWSWORTHINESS

There is little doubt that most courts would consider the issue of
homosexuality or sexual orientation to be a matter of public concern.
Independent of the social and political changes outlined in Part II of
this Comment, sexual orientation touches on central questions affect139
ing social intercourse, human rights, and the nature of the family.
The mere fact that ten percent of the population is estimated to be gay
supports the conclusion that information about issues surrounding
homosexuality is newsworthy. The question becomes murkier, however, when courts consider whether information about a particular
person's homosexuality is a matter in which the public has a legitimate interest.140
In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 41 the Supreme Court of California addressed the issue whether a question of broad social concern
could be a matter of public interest, while the name of the actor
involved could be held to be outside the domain of newsworthy information. The plaintiff in Briscoe, an ex-convict, was featured in a 1967
138. See McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 531 (E.D. Penn. 1982) (nude
photograph of plaintiff in bathtub was not newsworthy since it served no "legitimate purpose
of disseminating news and needlessly expose(d] aspects of the plaintiff's private life to the
public"). In spite of the constraints placed on the media by the community standards clause,
the privilege has nevertheless been criticized by some as being overly generous in scope.
"What is at issue, it seems to me, is whether the claim of privilege is not so overpowering as
virtually to swallow the tort." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 (1967) (quoting Harry J.
Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROaS. 326, 336 (1966).
139. See Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (letter to editor on prejudice
against homosexuals deals with matter of public concern); see also Coleman v. Tennessee, 470
U.S. 1009 (1985) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983), which held that some
issues such as "racial discrimination" are "inherently of public concern").
140. "Outside of something like a sex change by the president, I can't think of a situation in
which just the pure fact of someone's sexual orientation is newsworthy." Mills, supra note 19,
at 24 (quoting Deni Elliott, Director of Ethics Institute at Dartmouth College). Gay activists,
however, counter that the "public interest" defense is a smokescreen for heterosexist reporting,
that far from maintaining a shield of privacy, the media writes about sexuality all the time, and
that the real reason for their attitude is that "they just find homosexuality distasteful and don't
want to write about it." Id. at 25 (quoting author Randy Shilts). Shilts maintains that
newspapers' refusals to reveal a person's homosexuality have less to do with ethical
considerations of privacy than with the homophobia of particular editors. Shilts, supra note
33, at All; see also Rotello, supra note 61, at 10.
For cases that distinguish between the newsworthiness of an issue and the newsworthiness
of private facts about a particular person's life, see Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1975); and Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985) (distinguishing between
newsworthiness of plastic surgery and private fact of plaintiff's facial reconstruction).
141. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
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article about truck highjackings and truckers' efforts to stop them.
The article identified the plaintiff by name as a man who stole a "valuable looking" truck and fought a gun battle with local police, but
neglected to mention that the hijacking occurred in 1956.142
Although the plaintiff conceded that the subject of truck thefts and
the efforts to stop them may have been newsworthy, he maintained
43
that the use of his name was not.
In finding that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action, the court
acknowledged that freedom of discussion "must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the period." I However,
it drew the line at situations involving past crimes when identification
of the actor served little independent public purpose. 145 If the state's
goal was to punish Briscoe for robbing trucks, the court saw no problem with publishing his name. If, however, the state's goal was the
reformation of criminals, as it was in California, publishing Briscoe's
name only served to undermine the state's objective. 46
Not all courts, however, have reached the same result. In
Montesano v. Donrey Media Group, 147 the Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to a
defendant whose name appeared in an article about a hit-and-run
accident he had been involved in twenty years earlier.' 48 The court
held that because the information appeared in the public record, and
the conviction for hit and run was intimately connected to the subject
matter of the news story, no cause of action had been stated.1 49
In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
Supreme Court of Nevada pointed to the importance of giving the
article credibility by specifically identifying the plaintiff. "The addition of the plaintiff's identity to the article personalized the report of
administrative excesses and lent specificity and credibility to the article."' 5 0 The court added that the plaintiff's experience had "a real
142. Id. at 36.

143. Id.
144. Id. at 38 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
145. Id. at 40. The court distinguished between an individual whose name is fixed in the
public memory, such as that of the political assassin, and an individual whose notoriety has
waned as a result of his action. Id.

146. Id. at 41. The court also pointed out that the consequences of revelation in this caseostracism, isolation, and the alienation of one's family-militated heavily against dismissing
the suit, since a jury might find that the disclosure, in light of the time that had passed, was

highly unreasonable. Id. at 43.
147. 668 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1983).
148. Id. at 1083.
149. Id.

150. Id. at 1086.
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bearing on the public issue,"'' and that a less stringent standard,
such as that adopted by the Supreme Court of Delaware, 5 2 was too
subjective.
Naming names undoubtedly -adds credibility and texture to a
story. People are seen not merely as statistics, but as human beings,
with real problems and concerns. 53 Indeed, the very reason newspapers publish human interest stories, rather than simply reporting statistics, or documented facts, is to bring home what, in another
154
context, might be regarded as simply someone else's problem.
However, the reasons that make disclosure of a person's identity
so desirable also make it a risky and often dangerous proposition.
People choose to keep certain facts hidden from others because the
facts can be harmful if they fall into the wrong hands.' 55 A drug
dealer, for instance, might be willing to talk to the media about his
operations, but only upon the condition of anonymity. Indeed, much
of the reporting surrounding highly controversial issues might well be
curtailed if journalists were5 6forced to print the actual names of
sources in all circumstances.

Moreover, limiting the reporting of names of individuals does not
prevent the media from writing passionately, and persuasively, about
151. Id. at 1087.
152. Id. (citing Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963)). The test the
Delaware Supreme Court adopted in that case was whether "the use of plaintiff's true name
was unnecessary and indelicate and a willful and wanton disregard of that charity which
should activate us in our social intercourse."
153. See, e.g., Madelaine Blais, The Disturbance, MIAMI HERALD, May 24, 1987 (Tropic
Magazine) (detailing one woman's battle with schizophrenia); Debbie Sontag, A Confession of
Pride, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16, 1990, at HI (chronicling gay priest's struggle with the
Catholic Church).
154. See, e.g., Elinor Burkett, The Teen Time Bomb: Unsafe Sex Is SpreadingAIDS Among
Florida's Youth, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 4, 1990, at II (discussing spread of AIDS among
teenagers).
155. See HUDSON & DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 33. Elinor Burkett reports:
Marsha Goldberg might be the first member of her temple sisterhood to struggle
with AIDS in her family. She isn't sure: AIDS isn't something her neighbors in
Kendall talk about. In her suburban world, you don't come out and announce
that your daughter has just been diagnosed with AID[S].
Burkett, supra note 154, at I1.
156. See, e.g., Meg Laughlin, The Lost Boys: A Year in the Life of a Drug Dealer's Family,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 3, 1988 (Tropic Magazine), at 11. The note at the beginning of the
article states that the children profiled agreed to tell their story for publication on the
condition that neither they nor their parents be identified by name. The author notes: "The
children whose lives are chronicled in today's story are not statistical composites. They are
real kids ...." Id. Similarly, Burkett notes: "Goldberg wishes she could [talk about her
daughter getting AIDS using] her real name and photograph. But her daughter Susan doesn't
want people to know that she's not just another University of Miami student." Burkett, supra
note 154, at II.
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serious social problems. A story about four "average" homosexualsa banker, a bricklayer, a police officer, and a lawyer-would be no less
compelling, if narrated persuasively, than one that identified the individuals by name. So long as the facts of the story are left essentially
unaltered, stories that identify persons pseudononymously are no less
15 7
credible than those that disclose actual names.

The question whether the name of a particular plaintiff is newsworthy, then, like the issue of what constitutes a private fact, depends
on context-specifically,
the status of the plaintiff and his or her role
58
in society.
2.

THE HOMOSEXUALITY OF PUBLIC FIGURES/PUBLIC OFFICIALS

In keeping with the spirit of the First Amendment, the Restatement has adopted a permissive attitude toward publicity about the

lives of public officials. The public is considered to have a legitimate
interest not only in matters that the individual makes public,' 59 but
also, to some reasonable extent, in matters that would otherwise be
private. 160
It is easy to see why the sexual orientation of public officials who
make policy decisions on matters concerning sexual orientation is a
matter of public interest. Unlike actors in the private arena, public
157. Laughlin, supra note 156, at 11. For other examples of stories in which either names
have been altered or identification has been limited to the use of first names, see Elinor
Burkett, The Family That Doesn't Exist, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 21, 1990, at IG (identifying
couple with AIDS as "Tim and Lynne"); Doug Clifton, Should We Print Names ofAccused
Prostitute's Clients?, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 1, 1991, at C4 (querying whether media should
print names of clients of accused prostitute); Sandi Wisenberg, Growing Up Gay, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 16, 1983, at GI (discussing plight of gay teenagers). The story may also not
necessarily be more accurate as a result of naming the individuals, since those interviewed may
be reluctant to speak candidly if they know their names will appear in print. Interview with
Steven Smith, Reporter for The Miami Herald (Jan. 25, 1991); see also Anna Quindlen,
Anonymous Accusers of Brock Adams, MIAMI HERALD, March 6, 1992, at 17A (where ages,
job descriptions, and telling details of women sexually harassed by U.S. senator were
unaltered, anonymous victims appeared "nameless but not faceless").
158. For a discussion of the relationship between newsworthiness and status, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. (b) (1977).

159. Id.
160. The Restatement is surprisingly tight-lipped on the issue of what constitutes a
"reasonable extent." Although the authors explicitly state that the extent of the authority to
make public private facts is not unlimited, they fail to offer any guidance as to what the
contours of such reasonableness ought to be. The comments say, for instance, that details of
an actress' sexual relations are private, yet in the same paragraph, adopt the position that "in
the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of community mores." Id. Courts have
tended to read the "reasonable extent" language of the Restatement liberally where public
figures are concerned. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
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figures owe their allegiance to the people who put them in office.' 6 1

Voters rely on public officials to make decisions responsibly and in a
manner consistent with the officials' own personal ethics and moral
standards. 16 2 When politicians make decisions that affect the lives of
vast numbers of people, it only stands to reason that they, as public
officials, owe the public an obligation at least to identify their reasons
for making those decisions.
This is not to suggest that officials are bound to a standard of
absolute objectivity, or that they must, as a result of their race, gender, or sexual orientation, "toe the party line". A gay congressman,
for instance, might vote against a gay rights bill for reasons that have
nothing to do with a sense of internalized homophobia, or even the
belief, however incongruous, that homosexuality is wrong.1 63 Nevertheless, the integrity of the political process depends upon politicians
being candid enough with their constituents to disclose their biases to
the public without masquerading behind a false identity.' 6
Even when public officials are not legislating or making policy
decisions on gay rights issues, the indirect influence they exert on such
matters may have a sufficient impact to justify subjecting their private
lives to public scrutiny. One would be hard pressed to argue that the
Secretary of Transportation, for instance, is in a place, by virtue of his
position, to help or harm homosexuals. However, to the extent that
he has access to high government officials and attends cabinet meetings with those who do, his influence may be greater on those matters
65
than that of the average citizen.
Nor does it follow that the sexual orientation of politicians who
are able to sidestep all issues concerning sexuality is irrelevant for
purposes of public scrutiny. Public officials serve, in many people's
161. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 262-284 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans. 1985)
(discussing the statesman's role in promoting a conception of "the good.").
162. Id.
163. See ROBERT E. BAUMAN, THE GENTLEMAN FROM MARYLAND: THE CONSCIENCE
OF A GAY CONSERVATIVE (1986).

164. Such candor is not limited to elected public officials. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Pete Williams' credibility, for instance, was seriously undermined when the media reported
that over 2,000 gay and lesbian service people had been discharged since his appointment in
1989. Signorile, supra note 29, at 34. Although rumors suggesting Williams was gay first
began circulating after he became a nightly figure in television reports about the Persian Gulf
conflict, Lisa M. Keen, Advocate Outs DOD Spokesperson Williams, WASH. BLADE, Aug. 9,
199 1, at 3, so many men apparently knew of Williams' homosexuality before that time that "it
[was] questionable as to whether he was ever in the closet." Signorile, supra note 29, at 39.
165. Even if a public official is not in fact biased, the public's perception that he is not fairminded may prevent him from doing his job effectively. See Signorile, supra note 29, at 34-3 5;
see also Withdraw Judge Ryskamp, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 17, 1991, at C2 (faulting U.S. Court
of Appeals nominee for belonging to allegedly discriminatory country club).
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minds, as models of civic and political decency. 66 The fact that gay
politicians would choose to ignore issues that affect a substantial
minority of their constituency, particularly when that group looks to
67
them for leadership, says something about their fitness as leaders.
The situation with public figures who are not public officials
presents a more difficult problem. There are two possible grounds on
which to justify the publication of non-political public figures' sexual
orientation: their positions as role models in society; and their
assumption of the risk of publicity. The first of these reasons-the
public figure's position-is addressed by the Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.'6 8
Jerry Falwell, a well-known religious leader, sued Hustler Magazine after it published a caricature of him.' 69 Falwell argued that the
state's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress was
sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is
patently offensive and intended to inflict emotional injury, even when
the speech could not reasonably have been interpreted to assert actual
facts about the public figure involved.' 7 0 The Court disagreed. In
finding that Falwell failed to state a cause of action, the Court looked
to the First Amendment's role in encouraging "robust political
debate"'' to justify its decision:
[T]he First Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical
of those who hold public office or those public figures who are
"intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern
to society at large." . . . "[O]ne of the prerogatives of American
citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures." ' 72
Although Falwell involved an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress rather than invasion of privacy, the Court's reasoning is relevant to the question of whether outed public figures ought to
be afforded a cause of action for invasion of privacy. It is true that
public figures are not responsible to the public in the same way as
politicians. Yet to the extent that a public figure reaps the benefits of
the public's like or dislike of his personal characteristics, he ought to
shoulder the social responsibility that accompanies such a position.
166. See, e.g., Withdraw Judge Ryskamp, supra note 165, at C2.
167. Cf. Signorile, supra note 29, at 34.
168. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
169. Id. at 47-48.
170. Id. at 50.
171. Id. at 51.
172. Id. (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring) and Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944) (citations omitted)).
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Indeed, because of the emphasis society places on achieving celebrity
status, actors and actresses are often more influential in affecting
social attitudes and public policy than politicians who spend their
lives lobbying for change. 173
Finally, although public figures do not completely bargain away
their right to privacy when they assume a position of civic or social
prominence, they voluntarily assume some risk that their lives will
come under public scrutiny when they enter the public eye. Part of
what becoming a celebrity involves is opening up one's private life to
public view. An actor whose sexual orientation is revealed to millions
of readers in the National Enquirer can express outrage, or even
anger, but he certainly cannot be said to express surprise.
3.

THE HOMOSEXUALITY OF INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURES

The most difficult question raised by outing concerns the private
lives of those who are involved in a public event, but are not themselves public figures. In Sipple, the California Court of Appeal found
that the publication of the plaintiff's homosexuality involved a matter
of legitimate public concern because it dealt with a public official's
response to a minority group and dispelled false stereotypes about
homosexuals. 174 While no one would dispute that an assassination
attempt on the President or the President's position on issues affecting
homosexuals are matters of public concern, the real question the opinion presents is what, if anything, Sipple's homosexuality had to do
with the newsworthy assassination attempt on Gerald Ford's life.
Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts takes a liberal
attitude toward publicity of private facts concerning ifivoluntary public figures. Newsworthiness is not limited to the event that arouses
the public interest, but includes, to some reasonable extent, facts
about the individual that otherwise would be purely private.175 However, there seems to be at least some authority for the proposition that
173. Magic Johnson's shocking announcement that he tested positive for the AIDS virus is
undoubtedly the best example of a star's ability to influence public opinion. Gary Blonston,
Celebrities Trigger Awareness, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 9, 1991, at I IA. For examples of other
celebrities whose works have dispelled public misconceptions about social problems, see
KTry DUKAKIS & JANE SCOVELL, Now You KNOW (1990) (alcoholism); HUDSON &
DAVIDSON, supra note 15 (AIDS); BARBARA GORDON, I'M DANCING AS FAST AS I CAN
(1979) (drug addiction); Roseanne Star Joins Those Breaking Silence on Incest, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 24, 1991, at 6A (incest).
174. Sipple v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct. App. 1984). The court did
not address the issue whether Sipple had become a public figure, although presumably it would
have concluded that he was not, since he did not voluntarily seek to place himself in the public
eye.

175.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D (1977).
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there must be a logical nexus between the facts published and the
76
newsworthy event for the newsworthiness privilege to be triggered.
In Sipple's case, it is unclear from the court's opinion whether
the publicity of his homosexuality would have been newsworthy if the
circumstances surrounding the assassination had been different. The
court of appeal certainly could have found that the disclosure of Sipple's homosexuality was newsworthy on the facts as presented,
because there was considerable speculation that Gerald Ford did not
invite Sipple to the White House because he was gay. A more difficult
question would have arisen, however, if Ford had invited Sipple to the
White House, because the President's position on homosexuality
would have borne no relation to the newsworthy event in which Sipple was involved.
The distinction between these two propositions is critical. In the
first instance, the public could be said to have a legitimate interest in
private facts about Sipple's life only to the extent that those facts had
bearing on his participation in the newsworthy event. Under this
interpretation of the common law, although the public might be interested in, say, Sipple's alcoholism, and the media might dispel negative
stereotypes about alcoholics by printing the information, it could not
do so unless a sufficient nexus existed between his alcoholism and the
aborted assassination attempt. 7 7 Alternatively, a court could find
under a liberal reading of the newsworthiness privilege that the public
had the right to know Sipple was homosexual not because of anything
Gerald Ford did, but simply because Sipple "became news." 178
Under that line of reasoning, the public not only could be argued to
have an interest .in
Sipple's sexual orientation, but also in the fact that
he was an alcoholic, or a paranoid schizophrenic-even though he
was neither drinking or on medication at the time he saved the president's life.' 7 9
It is not at all clear that such a broad reading of the newsworthi176. Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980). In Campbell, the wife of
author Joseph Campbell brought suit against Campbell's brother and a publisher for disclosure

of facts about her marriage. The court sidestepped the issue whether Carlyne Campbell was a
public figure, focusing instead on the scope of the newsworthiness privilege. In granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgement, the Fifth Circuit held that the newsworthiness
privilege for publishing private facts about involuntary public figures was not limited to the
dissemination of news "either in the sense of current events or commentary upon public affairs,
[but] extends to information concerning interesting phases of human activity." Id. at 397.
However, the court required a logical nexus between the private facts disclosed and the matter
of public interest as a means of safeguarding the plaintiff's privacy. Id.
177. Id. at 396.

178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
179. Id.
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ness privilege serves the best interest of either the plaintiff or the public. It is difficult to see how Sipple's drinking habits, or who he spends
his free time with, would become "legitimate" matters of public concern simply because he happened to find himself in the midst of a
public event. Indeed, such unwarranted intrusion into the details of a
person's private life may well have a chilling effect on the willingness
of citizens to involve themselves in community activities. People may
be more reluctant to speak to the media, or attend political rallies, if
they know that their lives may be subjected to the same sort of scrutiny as persons who voluntarily assume the risk that personal information about their private lives may come out. A public policy that
discourages citizens from performing public service not only harms
the individual, but cripples society as a whole.
4.

THE HOMOSEXUALITY OF PRIVATE FIGURES

If publishing private facts about public figures and public officials
in most cases can be justified on the basis of consent and benefit to the
public, a different rationale is necessary in cases where the actors are
purely private figures. Intuitively, it would seem that private litigants
would stand a better chance of recovering on a theory of invasion of
privacy, since their sexual orientation is less newsworthy under most
circumstances than that of a public figure. Yet in reality, this is not
the case. While private figures normally are able to satisfy the
Restatement's lack-of-newsworthiness requirement, they usually fail
to meet the tort's stringent publicity prong.
Beard v. Akzona, Inc.,180 illustrates this problem. In Beard, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
held that the plaintiff's privacy was not violated when the defendant
played a tape of a conversation between a co-worker and his female
lover, another co-worker, to a group of five management employees. 181 The court acknowledged that disclosure of the facts surrounding the plaintiff's relationship with his co-worker was both highly
offensive and not a legitimate matter of public concern. 182 However,
because the publication of the fact was confined to five individuals, all
of whom were management employees of the defendant corporation
and had some job-related connection to at least one of the parties, 8 3
the court held that the plaintiff had failed to show the publicity necessary to give rise to an action for invasion of privacy.
180.
181.
182.
183.

517 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
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When plaintiffs do manage to state a cause of action for small
group disclosures, they normally must rely on state privacy statutes
requiring publication, rather than publicity, of the facts disclosed. In
Bratt v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.,184 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts held that the disclosure of private facts about an
employee through an intracorporate communication was sufficient
publication under the state's right to privacy statute to give rise to a
cause of action."8 5 In determining whether the publication constituted an "unreasonable interference" with the plaintiff's privacy right
as defined under the statute, the court balanced the employer's interest in obtaining information about the plaintiff's mental condition
against the nature and scope of the intrusion on his privacy." 6 The
court held that since the information was highly intrusive and not
"reasonably necessary to serve a substantial and valid business interest of the employer,"'' 87 the employee had a right to keep the information private. 8 8
The discrepancy between the results in Bratt and Beard underscores the problem with requiring publicity, rather than publication,
in an action for public disclosure of private facts. It is unclear why
the plaintiff in Bratt suffered greater injury than the plaintiff in Beard
simply because sixteen individuals, rather than five, received the intracorporate communication detailing the plaintiff's psychological condition. Nor does the court's emphasis on the management status of
those privy to the disclosure justify the result, since management
employees are no more bound to confidentiality than others within a
company. 8 9 In both cases, the facts disclosed, not the number of persons to whom they were told, constitutes the real offense.' 90
This is not to say that statements about private actors are never
circulated widely enough to satisfy the publicity requirement. Indeed,
184. 467 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 1984).

185. Id. at 129.
186. Id. at 135.
187. Id.at 129. The court defined information reasonably necessary to include information
that would be important in the employees' effectiveness in their jobs. Id.
188. Id. at 135. The plaintiff in Bratt objected to the disclosure of facts about his mental
condition to sixteen employees, two of whom were managerial supervisors. Id. at 130.
189. Even if management employees were obligated to keep the information private, there is
no guarantee that such information will remain confidential. One of the supervisors in Beard,
in fact, acknowledged that he may have told his wife of the affair. Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517
F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
190. The degree of damage also may depend on the size and nature of the company. In
certain instances, disclosure to one person in a small company may do much greater damage
than disclosure to a number of people in a large corporate structure, where relationships are
more impersonal.
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two recent cases, one currently pending in a federal court,1 9 ' suggest

the opposite is the case. 192 But since most outings in the private context involve employer-employee situations, 193 unless the disclosure is
sufficiently widespread, plaintiffs face an uphill battle. 194
191. O'Neill, supra note 25, at 13. The Lambda Legal Defense Fund brought the action in
question under a state antidiscrimination statute on behalf of a former reporter for United
Press International who also freelanced for the Washington Blade, a gay newspaper. Lambda
sued UPI, a Wisconsin radio talk show host, and a Christian radio network after the reporter
was harassed and fired from her job because of her sexual orientation. According to the
complaint, the plaintiff was outed by a talk show host for the Voice of Christian Youth after he
learned from her coworkers that she was a lesbian. Brienza v. United Press International, Inc.,
No. CA 90-2925 (CRR) (D.D.C. filed Nov. 29, 1990). UPI subsequently fired her for violating
its no-freelance rule, even though the company had never fired an employee for the first
violation of free-lancing rules, and when it did fire employees for more than a single violation,
the dismissal involved much more extreme circumstances. The reporter's complaint involved
two claims: first, that the talk-show host violated the state's hate-crime law and common law
right to privacy by using the telephone and public airwaves to personally harass her and reveal
her as a lesbian without her consent; and second, that UPI violated the District of Columbia's
Human Rights Law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id.
192. See Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998 (App. Div. 1984) (reinstating
defamation complaint against group of musicians who made statements over radio that
plaintiff was homosexual). Interestingly enough, the plaintiff in Matherson did not bring a
cause of action in invasion of privacy, and therefore the court did not rule on the issue of
whether adequate publicity had been made. However, were the court to have ruled on such a
claim, it would have presumably found the broadcast to be sufficiently widespread to satisfy
the tort's publicity requirement.
193. In Ruden v. Kay-Bee Toy & Hobby Shops, an action brought under the Massachusetts
Human Rights Act, the plaintiff, a gay male, sued his supervisor and co-worker after he was
fired. Ruden v. Kay-Bee Toy & Hobby Shops, Inc., No. 90-BEH0748 (Mass. Comm'n Against
Discrimination filed June 7, 1990). According to the complaint, Ruden had received
consistently high evaluations from his supervisors until he got into an altercation with one of
his assistant managers. When the assistant manager threatened to tell other employees that
Ruden was gay, Ruden was forced to reveal his sexual orientation to his supervisor. Id. at 2.
Shortly thereafter Ruden was written up for defective performance and fired without
justification. Id. Ruden eventually settled out of court for an undisclosed sum. Telephone
interview with Mary Bonauto, Attorney for Michael Ruden (Nov. 5, 1990).
In Strawinski v. Murphy, a similar action brought under the same statute, a foreman with
an irrigation company was fired by the owner of his company after the owner of the company
supposedly learned from one of his friends that Strawinski was gay. Strawinski v. Murphy,
No. 90-BEA1230 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination filed Sept. 12, 1990). Murphy
repeatedly asked Strawinski if he "ha[d] anything contagious for me and the crew,"-an
alleged reference to AIDS-according to the complaint, and later when Strawinski went for a
job interview, a prospective employer told him that "Murphy mentioned something about
what you do in your private time." Id. at 2.
194. Wick proposes modifying the Restatement test to remedy this problem. Specifically, he
suggests adopting a Fourth Amendment approach to the question of whether the facts
disclosed were private and eliminating the community mores aspect of the newsworthiness
defense with regard to private figure plaintiffs. Wick, supra note 108, at 428-29. I agree with
Wick on these two points. I disagree, however, with his conclusion that the "highly
offensiveness" prong of the private facts tort "should hardly be an obstacle for a victim of
outing." Id. at 424. The Restatement specifically states that the protection afforded to the
plaintiff with respect to highly offensive publicity "must be relative to the customs of the time
and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow
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It is also possible to imagine situations in which the sexual orientation of a private figure would be a matter of legitimate public concern. Imagine, for instance, that a private liberal arts college is
embroiled in a debate over whether to fund a student forum on gay
rights. The dean of students, a closeted homosexual, sits on the panel
that decides how funds to student groups are to be allocated. The
dean receives requests from ten other organizations, including two
that propose similar forums on date rape and the crisis in the Middle
East. When the funding committee deadlocks, the dean decides to
fund the Middle East forum, but not the other two.
Under a pure public figure analysis, the dean of the college would
probably retain her right to privacy, since she does not meet the
Supreme Court's definition of a public figure.' 95 Under a "newsworthiness" standard, however, the dean's decisions might well become a
matter of legitimate public interest, because they affect a significant
number of students and faculty members in the community.
Where precisely courts should draw the line between matters of
legitimate public concern and matters that are purely private within
the context of private actors does not lend itself easily to bright line
rules. A high school teacher who advocates homosexuality as an
alternative lifestyle in a class on comparative cultures ought not to
forfeit all rights she may have to keep the public out of her bedroom
simply because she is doing her job in a manner some people might
question. Yet, to the extent that her decisions concerning textbook
selection and course materials have an impact on hundreds of students every year, her actions are no less a matter of public concern to
the members of her community than a congressional decision to adopt
a spousal benefits program for same-sex partners. 96 Ultimately, the
best that can be said of situations in which private figures set policy or
make managerial decisions involving gay issues is that they need to be
examined closely, and on a case-by-case basis, with sensitivity to all
the parties involved.
E.

The Limits of the Newsworthiness Privilege

Were the newsworthiness privilege an unqualified license to print
citizens." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) cmt. c. (emphasis added).
Thus, if the modification of the tort is truly to be effective, the question of whether the
publicity of a person's homosexuality is highly offensive to the reasonable person of ordinary

sensibilities must be analyzed without regard to locality. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
195. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
196. Bok limits public interest to matters that "affect (the public] welfare." BOK, supra note
73, at 249-58.
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whatever the media deemed of interest to the public, the legal analysis
of the outing dilemma would end here. However, the privilege is not
without its limits. In order for the publication of a person's sexual
orientation to be newsworthy, it must not be so offensive as to shock
community notions of decency.1 97
In Sipple, the California Court of Appeal offered two explanations to support its finding that the publication was not so offensive as
to shock community notions of decency. First, because Sipple had
already publicly disclosed the facts of his homosexuality through his
conduct and association with members of the gay community, his
homosexuality could not be considered a private fact.' 9 Second,
because the 'publication of Sipple's homosexuality was motivated by
political considerations, rather than "a morbid and sensational prying
into appellant's private life," ' 99 the court held that "a much greater
intrusion into an individual's private life [would] be sanctioned." 2"
The language in Sipple offers some support for the proposition
that "political" outings fall into a different category than those motivated by simple malice because of the difference in intent, and as a
result, ought to receive a higher level of protection.20 Such a theory
has since been categorically rejected by the Supreme Court with
regard to public figures 20 2 on the grounds that outrageousness in the
area of political and social discourse has "an inherent subjectiveness
about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of
the juror's tastes or views, or perhaps on their dislike of a particular
expression."2 "3 Whether such a distinction between the two types of
outings would still be recognized by the Supreme Court in actions
brought by private figures, however, is unsettled.
The Court's refusal to take motive into account in the area of
public debate makes sense in the context of public figures. Robust
debate concerning the lives of public officials is, as has often been pro197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

652D (1977).
Sipple v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 670.
Id.
For a discussion of the notion that political expression might be entitled to greater
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

protection than other "lesser" forms of speech, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens' position, however, has never been adopted by a majority
of the Court.
202. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
203. Id. at 54. In his complaint, Falwell attempted to distinguish the caricature which
appeared in Hustler from the broader genre of traditional political cartoons on the basis of the
author's intent. While the court acknowledged that the Hustler publication was at best a
distant cousin of the [traditional] political cartoons," it was ultimately unwilling to draw a
bright line separating the one from the other because of the threat such action posed to the
First Amendment.
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claimed, central to a healthy democracy, 2°4 and people who enter the
limelight assume the risk that their lives will be subjected to close
scrutiny.2 °5 Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons why motive
ought to play at least some role in determining the defendant's liability in an outing action involving private figures. First, although the
results of an outing motivated by spite and an outing motivated by
politics may be the same, the two are qualitatively different. A public
policy that encourages political change through nonviolent means
necessarily enhances the democratic process, even if, as is the case
here, individuals sometimes get hurt.20 6 Second, to the extent that the
judicial system serves the public not merely to compensate for specific
injuries, but also to deter people from engaging in certain kinds of
behavior, drawing distinctions between good and bad outing promotes
' 20 7
an appropriate conception of "the good.
The difficulty with applying a pure motive test to the problem of
outing in the realm of private figures, however, is that it is inherently
subjective. Suppose, for instance, that an employee involved in gay
rights activities outs a co-worker after he writes him up for failing to
show up on time for his job.20 8 Under a motive test, a court certainly
could look to objective evidence of a hostile motive, such as political
affiliations or camaraderie with fellow employees. However, the ultimate determination about which motive was the proximate cause of
the outing-the legitimate or the illegitimate one-would rest on
speculation. Courts might presume outings by heterosexuals to be
illegitimate unless the defendants could offer evidence of a political
motive, but this presumption would still leave open the problem of
what to do in a situation involving mixed motives within the homosexual community. °9
The real problem with relying exclusively on motive as a predicate for liability, however, is that it promotes behavior that violates
human dignity. Although outing is certainly a form of political pro210 or fighting taxes. 2 1'
test, it is not the same as boycotting a business
A bankrupt business can be rebuilt, and a tax reinstated, but an outed
204. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963).
205. Id. at 275.
206. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (192).
207. PLATO, supra note 161, at 262-84.
208. See, e.g., Complaint of Michael Ruden, supra note 193.
209. For an analysis of how the problem of mixed motive is dealt with in the area of Title
VII discrimination actions, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
210. See, e.g, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
211. HENRY D. THOREAU, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN, OR LIFE IN THE
WOODS AND ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 222 (Signet 1960) (1844).
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homosexual can never go back into the closet once his sexual orientation has been revealed.
Outing differs from other forms of political protest precisely
because the damage it causes is irrevocable. In the same way that a
woman can be irreparably harmed psychologically by protesters lying
down in front of an abortion clinic and shoving pictures of a fetus at
her,21 2 the outed plaintiff can never recover the opportunity of
revealing core information about himself to the most important people in his life, even if the experience ultimately proves beneficial. Such
a loss may seem like a small price to pay in the name of combatting
prejudice and educating people about homosexuality, but to those
affected by it, the damage is often incalculable.
This is not to suggest that the actor's methods or the nature of
the publicity are irrelevant to a consideration of whether the publicity
is newsworthy. Both Sipple and the Restatement allow for a cause of
action where the publicity is unduly sensational and constitutes "a
morbid ... prying into appellant's private life."' 21 3 Thus, although a
story announcing the homosexuality of a public figure might not be
actionable, a photograph of him having sex with his lover or a discussion in graphic detail of the nature of his sexual exploits would almost
certainly give rise to a cause of action.2 14
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether a person's sexual orientation is a matter of legitimate
public concern is ultimately less a question about whether sex is private than a question about when sex becomes public. When a person's sexual orientation substantially affects the lives of others outside
the realm of his circle of intimate acquaintances, it can no more be
considered a private fact than his eye color, or what he eats for lunch.
If, on the other hand, a person's sexual orientation is of no legitimate
concern to the public, it ought to be off limits to the media and other
disinterested third parties.
No bright line rule exists for determining the precise contours of
the right to privacy. In general, the more prominent a role a person
plays in society, the more likely his homosexuality should be regarded
as a matter of legitimate public concern. Public officials have an obli212. See Dudley Clendinen, The Abortion Conflict; What It Does to One Doctor, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1985 (Magazine), at 18 (discussing the effect of abortion protests on women
seeking abortions).
213. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
214. See McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (nude photograph
of plaintiff in bathtub served "no legitimate purpose of disseminating news" (quoting Aquino v.
Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 429 (1959)).
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gation to speak candidly about their sexual orientation in order to
preserve the integrity of the political process, as do celebrities and
other non-elected public figures to the extent that they shape public
opinion. Private citizens ought to be afforded a greater right to privacy as a result of their decision not to opt for notoriety, although
that right is subject to revocation if they place themselves in a political role in which homosexuality becomes a political issue, or make
their homosexuality a matter of general public knowledge.
Courts which recognize a cause of action for outing should not
be accused of being antigay simply because they find as a matter of
law that the publicity of a person's homosexuality is highly offensive
to the reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Saying the publicity
of homosexuality is highly offensive to the average person is not the
same thing as saying homosexuality is highly offensive. The former,
involves acknowledging homophobia as a social problem; the latter,
condemning it. It behooves both heterosexuals and homosexuals to
take note of the difference.
In the end, the legal arguments surrounding outing can best be
summed up by two disparate images: the image of the closeted gay
teenager, desperately in search of role models to help him develop a
sense of self-esteem, and the image of the outed employee, stripped of
his livelihood, his friends, and his right to determine the direction of
his life. That neither image is particularly palatable is less a reflection
of any shortcoming in the legal system and its inability to "do justice," than a reflection of the damage that results when certain members of a society are regarded as inherently less worthy, or valuable,
than others. Until we as a nation accept gay people as citizens, affording them not only full legal protection, but also dignity and respect,
we will continue to be haunted by these images, the faces of countless
men and women, no different from the rest of society, except for
whom they choose to love.
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